Oligopolistic Competition and Economic Geography by Zhou, Haiwen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Oligopolistic Competition and Economic
Geography
Haiwen Zhou
8 September 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88919/
MPRA Paper No. 88919, posted 15 September 2018 07:47 UTC
Oligopolistic Competition and Economic Geography 
 
Haiwen Zhou 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper studies a general equilibrium model of economic geography in which firms 
engage in oligopolistic competition.  This framework is conducive to analytic results.  With 
increasing returns, oligopolistic competition leads to inter-industry trade between regions rather 
than intra-industry trade.  The choice of appropriate technology is a channel of concentration of 
industries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In his famous book, Porter (1990) argues that concentration of firms producing similar 
products in given regions is a common phenomenon rather than exceptional.  Issues related to the 
location choices of firms are interesting to both regional and national governments trying to keep 
current and seeking new business opportunities.  Krugman (1991) has studied a model of economic 
geography based on monopolistic competition.  Many useful insights have emerged from this line 
of literature.  However, as discussed in Neary (2001) and Head and Mayer (2004), there are some 
well-recognized limitations of the monopolistic competition approach.  First, strategic interaction 
among firms is absent.  Second, with the constant elasticity substitution utility function, a firm’s 
output is independent of the size of the market.  For monopolistic competition models, trade 
changes the number of varieties, rather than scales of production.  As increasing returns to scale is 
strongly emphasized in the “new economic geography”, it is important to study how a firm’s scale 
of production changes with the fundamentals.  
For the monopolistic competition approach, it is assumed that new varieties are always 
freely available.  With this assumption, a firm always prefers to produce a product different from 
existing ones to avoid competition with other firms.  In reality, new varieties may be obtained only 
through very costly research and development effort.  In this paper, it is assumed that the number 
of varieties in the manufacturing sector is fixed.  This paper contributes to the literature by 
incorporating oligopolistic competition into a general equilibrium model of economic geography 
and deriving results analytically.1   As the number of varieties in the manufacturing sector is 
                                                 
1 One difficulty of incorporating oligopolistic competition into a general equilibrium framework is related to 
the following issue.  A firm is both a seller of output and a buyer of labor input.  To study the impact of a 
firm’s market power in the output market, the number of firms in the output market should be small.  
However, a firm may also have market power in the factor market when the number of firms is small.  A 
firm’s market power in the factor market may complicate the study of market power in the product market.  
Neary (2003) and Ruffin (2003) have more detailed discussions of the possible strategies adopted in the 
literature in modeling oligopolistic competition in a general equilibrium framework.  In this paper, there is a 
continuum of manufactured goods.  Though each firm has market power in the industry it operates, a firm 
does not have market power in the factor market since the number of manufacturing industries is infinity. 
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exogenously given, each variety or product is produced by multiple firms.  There are two regions 
and each region has two sectors: agriculture and manufacturing.  Agricultural technology exhibits 
constant returns to scale and manufacturing technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale.  For 
firms producing the same manufactured goods, they engage in oligopolistic competition: each 
firm’s optimal strategy depends on other firms’ strategies.  This kind of strategic interaction leads 
a firm’s price and quantity of production to change with the environment it operates in.  Except for 
the assumption of oligopolistic competition, other assumptions in this paper are similar to those in 
Krugman (1991). 
We show that some results are robust regardless of whether the market structure is 
monopolistic competition or oligopoly.  First, the real wage rate in terms of manufactured goods is 
higher and the real wage rate in terms of agricultural goods is lower in the region with a larger 
number of workers.  Second, a higher propensity to spend on manufactured goods increases the 
propensity of agglomeration.  Third, a higher elasticity of demand for manufactured goods makes 
agglomeration less likely to be stable. 
The assumption of oligopolistic competition also leads to results significantly different 
from those based on monopolistic competition.  First, the patterns of trade are different.  In the 
monopolistic competition framework, a firm producing manufactured goods in the region with a 
lower population can sell its product to the region with a higher population because it is the only 
firm in the world producing this product.  Regions engage in intra-industry trade.  With oligopolistic 
competition, a firm producing manufactured goods in the region with a higher population has a 
higher scale of production, thus a lower average cost and a lower price.  A firm producing 
manufactured goods in the region with a lower population will not be able to sell its product to the 
region with a higher population.  Regions engage in inter-industry trade: the region with a larger 
amount of workers exports manufactured goods to the other one in exchange for agricultural 
products.  Thus, there is no necessary connection between intra-industry and internal increasing 
returns to scale. 
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Second, in Krugman (1991), to compare workers’ utilities in the two regions, a price index 
is needed and this makes analytical results difficult to obtain and simulations are used to gain 
insights.2  A price index is needed because some manufactured goods are transported from the 
region with a higher population to the region with a lower population and some other manufactured 
goods are transported in the opposite way.  With oligopolistic competition, manufactured goods 
may be transported from the region with a higher population to the region with a lower population, 
but not the opposite way.  As a price index is not needed, the oligopolistic competition approach is 
rich in analytical results. 
Third and finally, in the monopolistic competition framework, firms in different regions 
have the same scale of production.  In the oligopolistic competition framework, a firm’s scale of 
production increases with the size of the market.  In this paper, manufacturing firms located at 
different regions are not restricted to have the same technology.  Different scales of production in 
different regions lead to choices of different technologies.  Thus, another contribution of this paper 
is that this framework is conducive to the incorporation of the choice of technology as a channel of 
concentration of industries. 
In principle, models based on monopolistic competition can generate the result that a firm’s 
markup is not constant.  For example, with linear demand, Ottaviano et al. (2002) also allow for 
different scales of production in different locations.  However, Krugman (1991) and others have 
used the special utility function featuring constant elasticity of demand as the general utility 
function is not as tractable as the special one. 
To our limited knowledge, there are very few empirical studies testing different 
implications between monopolistic competition and oligopolistic competition.  One reason is that 
monopolistic competition is the primary paradigm used for theoretical studies with a general 
equilibrium structure.  In reality, oligopolistic competition is a very important type of market 
                                                 
2 Green (1964) has a detailed discussion of aggregation in economics. 
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structure.  Casual observation shows that many industries are dominated by a few large firms.  For 
example, the market of large commercial aircraft is dominated by Airbus and Boeing.  In their 
textbook, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005, p441) write “oligopoly is a prevalent form of market 
structure.  Examples of oligopolistic industries include automobiles, steel, aluminum, 
petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and computers.” 
In the literature, Combes (1997) and Dewit et al. (2003) have studied economic geography 
based on oligopolistic competition.  Their approaches and focuses are quite different from those in 
this paper.  Combes (1997) assumes that markets are segregated rather than integrated.  Dewit et 
al. (2003) are mainly interested in studying the use of labor standard as a commitment device when 
strategic interaction between firms is important. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 studies the equilibrium in which 
different regions are in autarky.  The equilibrium with regional trade is studied in Section 3.  Two 
possible channels for industries to concentrate in one region are examined in the next three sections.  
In Sections 4 and 5, factor movement may work as a channel for firms to concentrate in one region.  
In Section 4, there is no regional trade.  In Section 5, there is regional trade.  In Section 6, firms’ 
optimal choices of their production technologies may act as the channel for firms to concentrate.  
Section 7 suggests some extensions of this line of research and concludes. 
 
2. REGIONS IN AUTARKY 
 There are two regions: region 1 and region 2.  Each region has two sectors: agriculture and 
manufacturing.  There are two factors of production: farmers and workers.  Farmers are specific to 
the agricultural sector.  Workers are specific to the manufacturing sector, but they may move 
between firms producing different manufactured goods.  In this section, there is neither trade of 
goods nor movement of factors of production between regions.  The number of farmers in each 
region is denoted by AL .  For 2,1i , the number of workers in region i  is iL .  In this paper, 
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subscripts are frequently used to denote different regions (region 1 or region 2) and superscripts 
are frequently used to denote different sectors (agriculture or manufacturing).  The analysis focuses 
on region 1 as the study of region 2 is similar.  In the following, sometimes only notations for 
region 1 are explained as the notations for region 2 correspond to those for region 1. 
Both regions have access to the same set of production technologies.  It is assumed that the 
production technology of agricultural goods exhibits constant returns to scale.  Without further loss 
of generality, it is assumed that one farmer produces one unit of agricultural goods.  Thus, the 
output of agricultural goods in each region is AL .  The price of agricultural goods is normalized to 
1: 1Ap .  Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), there is a continuum of manufactured goods 
indexed by a number ]1,0[ .3  To produce each manufactured product, both a fixed cost and a 
marginal cost are needed.  With the existence of fixed costs of production, there is increasing returns 
to scale in the manufacturing sector.  All goods are symmetric in the sense that they have the same 
cost structure.  To simplify analysis, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium.  In a symmetric 
equilibrium, the price and the quantity of production of all the manufactured goods will be the 
same.  
In the following, conditions for an equilibrium are studied.  First, a consumer’s utility 
maximization is studied.  A consumer chooses the quantity of consumption to maximize her utility.  
Let AAC1  denote a region 1 farmer’s consumption of agricultural goods and 
AMC1  denote this 
farmer’s consumption of manufactured goods.  For   and   denoting positive constants, a 
farmer’s utility function is given by 
1
)1(
1
1
0 11
))(()(







 




  dCCU AMAAA .  As firms make a 
profit of zero in equilibrium, consumers only have wage income.  A farmer’s budget constraint is 
                                                 
3 Early on, Aumann (1964) has studied a model with a continuum of traders. 
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given by 1)()( 11
1
01
   dCpC AMMAA .  Let MAC1  denote a region 1 worker’s consumption of 
agricultural goods and MMC1  denote this worker’s consumption of manufactured goods.  A region 
1 worker’s utility function is 
1
)1(
1
1
0 11
))(()(







 




  dCCU MMMAM .  The wage rate in region 
i  is iw .  Let 
m
ip  denote the price of manufactured goods in region i .  A region 1 worker’s budget 
constraint is 111
1
01
)()( wdCpC MMMMA    . 
 From a consumer’s utility maximization, a consumer spends a fixed   percent of total 
income on agricultural goods and 1  percent of total income on manufactured goods.4  As there 
is a continuum of manufactured goods, a given manufactured product’s share of total manufactured 
output is zero.  As a result, farmers and workers’ elasticities of demand are given by 
(1a)     M
AM
AM
M
p
C
C
p
1
1
1
1 ,            
(1b)     M
MM
MM
M
p
C
C
p
1
1
1
1 .            
Second, a manufacturing firm’s profit maximization is studied.  A firm takes the wage rate 
as given and chooses its quantity of production to maximize its profit.  A region i  firm’s fixed cost 
in terms of the amount of labor needed is if  and its constant marginal cost in terms of the amount 
of labor needed is i .  It is not necessary to require the costs of production in the two regions to 
be the same.  For ix  denoting a region i  manufacturing firm’s quantity of production, this firm’s 
profit is iiiii
m
i wxfxp )(  . 
                                                 
4 Ottaviano et al. (2002) study a model of agglomeration in which the utility function is quadratic.  In their 
paper, the percentage of income spent on a given product is not constant. 
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 In each region, for each product, there are multiple firms producing this homogeneous 
product.  Let im  denote the number of manufacturing firms in region i  producing the same 
product.  The number of firms belonging to a sector is a real number rather than an integer number.  
For firms producing the same product, they engage in Cournot competition.  The first order 
condition for a region 1 firm’s optimal output requires that 
(2)    11
1
1
1
1
1 1 wx
p
p
xp
m
m
m 




 .             
Equation (1) is a familiar condition stating that the price charged by a firm depends on the elasticity 
of demand it faces.  The elasticity of demand faced by a firm is different from a given consumer’s 
elasticity of demand as there are other firms producing the same market.  
Third, it is assumed that firms can freely enter and exit an industry.  As a result, a firm 
makes a profit of zero.5  Zero profit for a manufacturing firm in region 1 requires that 
(3)    11 xp
m 0)( 1111  wxf  .             
 Fourth, labor market needs to be cleared.  Each firm in region 1 demands 111 xf   units 
of workers.  Since the amount of manufacturing firms in region 1 is 1m , the total demand for 
workers in region 1 is )( 1111 xfm  .  As each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically, the 
total supply of workers in region 1 is 1L .  Equalization of demand and supply of labor in region 1 
requires that 
(4)    11111 )( Lxfm   .              
                                                 
5 Oligopolistic competition with fixed costs and free entry has been studied extensively in the literature on 
strategic trade, see Sections 3.7 and 4.5 of Brander (1995) for a review of this line of literature.  Oligopolistic 
competition with free entry is also discussed in Mankiw and Whinston (1986). 
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Fifth and finally, markets for manufactured and agricultural goods need to be cleared.  For 
manufactured goods in region 1, the total demand is MMAMA CLCL 111   and the total supply is 
11xm .  Equalization of demand and supply of manufactured goods in region 1 requires that 
(5)   1111111  xxxmCLCL MMAMA ,            
where 1x  denotes output from all other firms. A farmer’s income is one and a region 1 worker’s 
income is 1w .  As a consumer spends 1  percent of income on manufactured goods, a farmer’s 
demand of manufactured goods is mp1
)1( 
 and a region 1 worker’s demand is mp
w
1
1)1(  .  Thus, 
equation (5) leads to 
(6)    11
1
11
1
)1( xm
p
wL
p
L
mm
A




 .             
The demand for agricultural goods in region 1 is MAAAA CLCL 111  .  As each farmer 
produces one unit of output, the supply of agricultural goods is AL .  Equalization of demand and 
supply of agricultural goods in region 1 requires that MAAAA CLCL 111  AL .  As a consumer 
spends   percent of income on agricultural goods, this leads to 
(7)   )( 11LwL
A  AL .              
In a Cournot equilibrium, for a firm choosing its output 1x , this firm views that 1x  does 
not change when it adjusts 1x .  Differentiation of both sides of equation (5) yields 
(8)  m
AM
A
m p
CL
p
x
1
1
1
1




m
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p
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1
1
1 
       
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



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1
.         
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From (1a), (1b), (5), and (8), it can be shown that the elasticity of demand faced by a 
manufacturing firm is m
m
px
xp
11
11

 1m .  Plugging this elasticity into equation (2) leads to 
(9)    11
1
1
1 1
w
m
mp m 



 .             
As equation (9) is essential in understanding this framework of oligopolistic competition, 
it deserves some explanation.6  This equation shows that a firm’s price as a markup over the 
marginal cost of production decreases with the number of firms producing the same product, which 
is endogenously determined by the extent of the market as measured by 1L .  There are two special 
cases of this equation.  First, if there is only one firm producing each product ( 11 m ), equation 
(9) degenerates to 111 1
wp m 



 , which is equation (5) in Krugman (1991, p. 489).  Second, 
for perfect competition ( 1m ), equation (9) shows that a firm’s price equals marginal cost. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, equations (3), (4), (6), (7), and (9) form a set of five equations 
defining five variables 1m , 1w , 1x , 
mp1 , and 
Ap .  This set of equations can be solved explicitly.  
Equation (7) yields 
(10)    
1
1
)1(
L
Lw
A

 .            
The equilibrium values of other variables are given by 
(11)    
1
111
1 
 fLf
x

 ,            
(12)    
)/(
)1(
111
1
1 

LfL
Lp
A
m

 ,           
                                                 
6 Derivation of the elasticity of demand when firms engage in Cournot competition is illustrated in Zhou 
(2004, 2006). 
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(13)    
1
1
1 f
Lm  .             
From equations (11) and (13), both the number of manufacturing firms and a firm’s 
quantity of production increase with the number of workers in a region.  From (11), the degree of 
economies of scale measured by the ratio of the marginal product of labor to its average product 
equals )/(1 11 Lf  .  Thus, the degree of economies of scale depends not only on the elasticity 
of substitution  , but also on the ratio of fixed cost to labor endowment 11 / Lf . 
The following proposition studies the relationship between the real wage rate and the 
number of workers in a region. 
 
 Proposition 1: When regions are in autarky, a worker’s wage rate in terms of agricultural 
goods decreases with the number of workers in a region.  A worker’s wage rate in terms of 
manufactured goods increases with the number of workers in a region. 
Proof: Since the agricultural product is used as the numeraire, the first part of the 
proposition comes from equation (10).  For the second part of the proposition, dividing equation 
(10) by (12) yields 
(14)    
1
11
1
1 )/(1

 Lf
p
w
m

 .           
From (14), mpw 11 /  increases with 1L .       Q.E.D. 
 
From Proposition 1, when each region is in autarky, a worker’s wage rate in terms of 
manufactured goods increases with the number of workers in a region.  The reason behind this is 
that a firm’s scale of production increases with the number of workers.  With the fixed cost of 
production, average cost decreases with output.  As a firm makes a profit of zero, a lower average 
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cost means a lower price.  Thus, the real wage rate in terms of manufactured goods increases with 
the number of workers in a region. 
Proposition 1 shows the tradeoff faced by a worker located in a region with a larger number 
of workers.  With increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector, a worker’s consumption 
of manufactured goods is higher. However, as the supply of agricultural goods is fixed, the 
consumption of agricultural goods is lower. 
In Krugman (1991), a firm’s output and the ratio of a firm’s price to wage rate are not 
affected by the amount of labor in a region.  However, as a region with a higher labor endowment 
produces a higher number of manufactured goods and locally produced manufactured goods are 
less expensive than imported manufactured goods because of the existence of transportation costs, 
the price index is lower in a region with a higher number of workers.  In this sense, a worker’s real 
wage rate in terms of manufactured goods is also higher in a region with a higher amount of labor.  
In addition, in monopolistic competition models, a worker’s real wage rate in terms of agricultural 
goods is lower in a region with a higher amount of labor.  Thus, a worker’s real wage in terms of 
manufactured goods increases with the number of workers in a region and this worker’s wage rate 
in terms of agricultural goods decreases with the number of workers in a region is a robust feature 
of alternative assumptions of market structure. 
 
3. TRADE BETWEEN REGIONS 
In this section, the equilibrium with regional trade is studied.  Markets for manufactured 
goods in different regions are integrated.  It is assumed that the transportation cost for agricultural 
goods is zero and the transportation cost for manufactured goods between the two regions is 
positive.7   Following Samuelson (1954), for t  denoting a positive constant, for each unit of 
                                                 
7 Davis (1998) has shown that the assumption of zero transportation cost of agricultural goods may not be 
innocuous.  With a positive transportation cost for agricultural goods, the price of agricultural goods for the 
region importing agricultural goods will be higher than the price in the region exporting agricultural goods.  
In this case, compared to the case of zero transportation cost, the equilibrium of equal number of workers in 
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manufactured goods arrived, t1  units of goods need to be sent out.  If the transportation cost is 
too high, the two regions will not trade.  The two regions begin to trade when the price difference 
of manufactured goods is large enough to cover transportation costs.  
The total measure of workers in the two regions is exogenously given and is equal to L : 
LLL  21 .  Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 21 LL  .8  From Proposition 1, if the 
two regions have the same production technology and 21 LL  , region 1 has a lower price of 
manufactured goods.  Thus, manufactured goods will be exported from region 1 to region 2 if 
transportation cost t  is small enough.  The trade pattern is that region 1 exports manufactured 
goods to region 2 and imports agricultural goods from region 2.9  This result is summarized in 
Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: For regions with different amounts of workers, they engage in inter-industry 
trade. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that increasing returns to scale does not necessarily lead to intra-
industry trade.  The key factor leading to this result of inter-industry trade is that with oligopolistic 
competition a firm’s output increases with the extent of the market.  With monopolistic 
competition, it is assumed that each variety is produced by only one firm in the world, intra-industry 
naturally arises.  Both inter and intra industry trade are commonly observed in reality.  Whether 
monopolistic competition or oligopolistic competition applies depends on the specific conditions 
                                                 
the two regions is more likely to be stable.  The reason is as follows.  Starting from an equal number of 
workers in the two regions, if a worker moves from region 1 to region 2, the price of agricultural goods in 
region 1 will be higher than that of region 2.  This decreases a region 1 worker’s utility and decreases a 
worker’s incentive to move into region 1. 
8 This may be the result that some random events cause region 1 to have a higher endowment of workers. 
9 In this paper, the markets of manufactured goods in the two regions are integrated rather than segmented.  
As a result, cross-hauling of manufactured goods between the two regions Brander (1981) will not occur. 
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of an industry (such as the relative magnitude of fixed cost to the size of the market) and this can 
be addressed by empirical studies.  
From the specification of the transportation technology, the relationship between the prices 
of manufactured goods in the two regions is given by 
(15)    mm ptp 12 )1(  .           
Before trade, from (10), the wage rate in region 1 is lower than that in region 2.  Regional 
trade leads to an increase of the wage rate in region 1 and a decrease of the wage rate in region 2.  
With the existence of transportation costs, regional trade will not lead to an equalization of the 
wage rate between the regions. 
In the rest of this section, conditions for the equilibrium with regional trade are studied.  
First, for a firm in region 1, regardless of whether its output is sold in region 1 or transported to 
region 2, the price received by this firm is mp1 .  A region i  firm’s profit is i
m
i xp iiii wxf )( 
.  Zero profit for a firm in region i  requires that 
(16)   i
m
i xp 0)(  iiii wxf  , for 2,1i .         
 Second, equalization of demand and supply of labor in region i  requires that 
(17)   iiiii Lxfm  )(  , for 2,1i .          
Third, equalization of demand and supply of agricultural goods requires that 
  MAAAA CLCL 111  AMAAAA LCLCL 2222  .   
As a consumer spends   percent of income on agricultural goods, the above equation leads to 
(18)   )2( 2211 LwLwL
A  AL2 .                       
Fourth, let E  denote the quantity of export of manufactured goods from region 1 and let 
I  denote the quantity of imported manufactured goods arrived at region 2.  The specification of 
transportation technology requires that ItE )1(  .  For manufactured goods in region 1, the total 
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demand is MMAMA CLCL 111   and the total supply is Exm 11 .  Equalization of demand and 
supply of manufactured goods in region 1 requires that 
(19)   ExmCLCL MMAMA  11111 .                      
As a consumer spends 1  percent of income on manufactured goods, the above equation leads 
to 
(20)   Exm
p
wL
p
L mm
A 



 11
1
1
1
1
1)1(  .          
The supply of manufactured goods in region 2 is the sum of region 2 production 22 xm  and 
import I .  Equalization of demand and supply of manufactured goods in region 2 requires that 
(21)   IxmCLCL MMAMA  22222 .          
As a consumer spends 1  percent of income on manufactured goods, equation (21) leads to 
(22)   Ixm
p
wL
p
L mm
A 



 22
2
2
2
2
1)1(  .         
Equations (19) and (21) yield 
(23)  MMAMA CLCL 111  ))(1( 222 MMAMA CLCLt  11xm 22)1( xmt .       
Equations (20) and (22) yield 
(24)  



 mm
A
p
wL
p
L
1
1
1
1
1)1(  



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A
p
wL
p
Lt
2
2
2
2
1)1)(1(   
11xm 22)1( xmt .            
Finally, as the markets for manufactured goods in the two regions are integrated, a 
manufactured firm will take the response of consumers in both regions into consideration when it 
chooses its output.  From equation (23), the Cournot assumption leads to 
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Similarly, it can be shown that 
(26)   mm pt
xmtxm
p
x
2
2211
2
2
)1(
))1((



 
.          
Combining firms’ optimal output choices with equations (25) and (26) yields 
(27)   11
2211
1
1 ))1((
1 w
xmtxm
xp m 






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(28)   22
2211
2
2 ))1((
)1(1 w
xmtxm
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
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



 .         
The interpretation of equations (27) and (28) is similar to that of equation (9).  There are 
three comments on these two equations.  First, the impact of an increase of one unit of output for a 
firm in region 2 is similar to that of an increase of t1  units of output for a firm in region 1.  The 
reason is that t1  units of output must be sent out from region 1 in order to have region 2 to 
receive one unit of output.  Second, these equations show that a firm’s price as a markup over 
marginal cost increases with a firm’s market share.  This is intuitive in the sense that a firm’s market 
share is directly related to a firm’s monopoly power.  Third and finally, when there is no 
transportation cost and firms in different regions use the same production technologies, the two 
equations are symmetric. 
Equations (15)-(18), (24), and (27)-(28) form a system of nine equations defining a system 
of nine variables 1m , 2m , 1w , 2w , 1x , 2x , 
mp1 , 
mp2 , and 
Ap .  In the following, we study the 
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equilibrium in which firms in the same region have the same level of output.  Firms in different 
regions may have different levels of output. 
 
4. WORKER MOVEMENT WITHOUT TRADE 
Will the emigration of a worker increase other workers’ incentive to emigrate?  In this 
section and the next one, the impact of movement of workers across regions is studied.  In this 
section, worker movement without regional trade is examined.  The following proposition studies 
the stability of the equilibrium that the two regions have equal number of workers 2/L . 
 
Proposition 3: The equilibrium that the two regions have equal number of workers is locally 
stable if and only if 

 1
2
1
2
2
1




 
f
L
.      
Proof: From (10), (12), and the specification of the utility function, a region 1 worker’s 
utility is  
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 Differentiation of the above equation with respect to 1L  leads to 
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 Thus, whether 0
1

dL
dU M
 or not depends on whether 

 1
2
1
2
2
1




 
f
L
 or not.  
            Q.E.D. 
 When there is no regional trade, moving to a region with a larger population leads to two 
effects working on opposite directions.  The benefit comes from the lower price of manufactured 
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goods.  The cost comes from a lower level of consumption of agricultural goods.  Thus, whether 
the equilibrium is stable or not depends on the magnitude of the two effects.  Proposition 3 shows 
that the equilibrium with equal number of workers in the two regions is less likely to be stable if 
1/ fL ,  , or   increases.  First, if 1/ fL  is already large, when a worker moves to a region with 
a larger population, the decrease of the price of manufactured goods in this region will be small.  
That is, the benefit from a decrease of the price of manufactured goods is small.  Second, a higher 
elasticity of demand   decreases the number of firms producing the same product.  Third and 
finally, for a larger value of  , a consumer spends a large amount of income on agricultural goods, 
this increases the cost of moving to an area with a larger population. 
 
5. WORKER MOVEMENT WITH TRADE 
In this section, worker movement with regional trade is examined. 
The following proposition studies the condition for a region 1 firm to move to region 2 and 
make a nonnegative profit if all workers currently live in region 1.  The proof contains two steps.  
First, when all workers are in region 1, the wage rate and the price of manufactured goods in region 
1 are expressed as functions of exogenous parameters.  Second, the condition for a worker moving 
to region 2 to have a higher utility than a worker staying in region 1 is studied. 
 
Proposition 4: The configuration in which all workers concentrate in one region is an 
equilibrium if and only if 
(29)   
 
0)1(2
)1(
)/(1
1
1
21
1
2 




L
tf
t
Lf 



 .         
Proof: First, when all workers are in region 1, the following equations hold, 
(3)    11 xp
m 0)( 1111  wxf  ,             
(30)    Lxfm  )( 1111  ,            
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(32)    1111 )2)(1( xmpLwL
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(33)    11
1
1
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m
p m 

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

 .            
 Equation (30) comes from the equalization of demand and supply of workers in region 1.  
Equation (31) comes from clearance of the market for agricultural goods.  For equation (32), the 
left-hand side is the demand for manufactured goods and the right-hand side is the supply of 
manufactured goods.  Equation (33) comes from a region 1 manufacturing firm’s optimal output 
choice.  Solving this set of equations yields 
(34)    
L
Lw
A

 )1(2
1
 ,            
(35)    mp1  )/(1
)1(2
1
1
LfL
LA




.           
Second, for a firm to attract workers to region 2, it has to make sure that the utility of a 
worker in region 2 is not lower than a worker’s utility in region 1.  For mm ptp 12 )1(  , from the 
utility function, the lowest wage rate 2w  for a worker in region 2 to have a utility not lower than a 
worker’s utility in region 1 is 
(36)    1
1
2 )1( wtw
 .             
A firm moving to region 2 can make a nonnegative profit if and only if 
(37)   0)( 22222 2  wxfxp
m  .            
Demand for this firm comes from workers employed in this firm and farmers in this region.  The 
number of workers in this firm is 222 xf   and their total income is 2222 )( wxf  .  Region 2 
farmers’ income is AL .  As each consumer spends 1  percent of income on manufactured 
goods,  Am Lwxfxp  222222 )()1(  .  Rearrangement of this equation yields 
 19
(38)   
222
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
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Lwfx m
A

 .          
Plugging (15), (36), and (38) into (37) leads to (29).     Q.E.D. 
 
Results in Proposition 4 are consistent with those in Proposition 3.  From Proposition 4, 
first, an increase of the fixed cost 1f  or the marginal cost 1  (a decrease of 2f  or 2 ) makes 
concentration of workers in region 1 less likely to be an equilibrium.  This fits our intuition well.  
Second, 0/  dd .  Thus, a higher propensity to spend on manufactured goods makes the 
concentration more likely to be an equilibrium.  The reason is that as a higher percentage of income 
is spent on imported manufactured goods, moving to a region with a lower population becomes 
costlier.  Third, 0/  dd .  That is, a higher elasticity of substitution makes the concentration 
less likely to be an equilibrium.  The intuition behind this result is clear from equations (11) and 
(14).  From (11), a firm’s scale of production increases with a consumer’s elasticity of demand 
.  From (14), the real wage rate in terms of the price of manufactured goods increases with  .  That 
is, a higher   increases the real wage rate in region 1 and makes moving to region 2 less attractive.  
Fourth and finally, the impact of transportation cost on the stability of concentration is ambiguous.  
The reason is that a higher transportation cost leads to two effects working on opposite directions.  
On the one hand, it increases a region 2 firm’s market power and increases a defecting firm’s profit.  
On the other hand, it makes the imported manufactured goods more expensive and a defecting firm 
must pay a higher wage rate to its workers. 
The results here that a higher propensity to spend on manufactured goods and a lower 
elasticity of demand for manufactured goods make agglomeration more likely are consistent with 
results in Krugman (1991).  Thus, those results are robust under alternative assumptions of market 
structure. 
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The system of equations (15)-(18), (24), and (27)-(28) defining the trade equilibrium can 
be simplified into the following three equations:   
(39)  0)1(2)( 22111   ALLwLwV ,          
(40)  0)1(211
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.10        
These three equations define three variables 1w , 2w , and 
1
mp  as functions of exogenously 
given variables.  The following proposition studies the implications of the immigration of a worker 
into region 1 when there is regional trade.11 
 
 Proposition 5: When a worker moves from region 2 to region 1, the wage rates in the two 
regions increase, and the prices of manufactured goods decrease. 
 Proof: Differentiation of 1V , 2V , and 3V  with respect to 1w , 2w , 
mp1 , and 1L  leads to 
                                                 
10 Equations (39)-(41) are derived in the following way.  First, equation (39) comes from equation (18).  
Second, from (16), 
111
11
1
wp
wf
x
m 
 .  Plugging this value of 1x  and the value of 2211 )1( xmtxm   from 
(24) into equation (27) leads to equation (40).  Finally, equation (41) is derived in a way similar to the 
derivation of (40). 
11 The method of proving Proposition 5 can also be used to study the impacts of a change of transportation 
cost on the wage rates and the prices of manufactured goods.  By differentiating 1V , 2V , and 3V  with respect 
to 1w , 2w , 
mp1 , and t , it can be shown that a higher transportation cost decreases the wage rate in region 1 
and increases the wage rate in region 2.  An increase in transportation cost decreases the price of 
manufactured goods in region 1 and the impact on the price of manufactured goods in region 2 is ambiguous.  
The reason is that a higher transportation cost decreases the competitiveness and thus the price of region 1 
manufactured goods.  As the price of manufactured goods in region 2 is transportation cost inclusive, the 
total effect is ambiguous.  
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 From the above definition,   is the determinant of the coefficient matrix.  From (39), 
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0 .  Thus, 0 , 01  , 02  , and 03  .  Application of Cramer’s rule leads 
to 
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 1
1
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dw
, 

 2
1
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dL
dw
, and 

 3
1
1
dL
dp m
.  This leads to 0/ 11 dLdw , 0/ 12 dLdw , and 
0/ 11 dLdp m .          Q.E.D. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows.  An increase in the number of workers in 
region 1 leads to an increase of a manufacturing firm’s output in this region.  As the scale of 
production increases, average cost decreases and the price of manufactured goods in region 1 
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decreases.  From (15), the price of manufactured goods in region 2 also decreases. To break even, 
a manufacturing firm in region 2 responds by increasing its level of output.  This expansion of 
output is possible as the number of manufacturing firms in region 2 shrinks.  As a region 2 firm’s 
output increases, the wage rate in region 2 also increases.  
As wage rates in both regions increase, how relative wage rate changes is unclear.  To 
address this question, how the wage ratio changes with factor movement is examined.  Define the 
wage ratio between the two regions as 21 / www  .  A worker’s incentive to move is affected by 
the difference between the real wage rates in the two regions.  As all manufactured goods are 
exported from region 1 to region 2, a price index for manufactured goods is not needed to study a 
worker’s incentive to move.  From equation (15), the prices of manufactured goods in the two 
regions differ only by a positive constant.  So the difference between 21 / ww  and 
)//()/( 2211 pwpw  is also a constant.  Thus, the ratio of nominal wages provides the needed 
information to study a worker’s incentive to move.  The following proposition studies how the 
wage ratio changes with factor movement. 
 
Proposition 6: When a worker moves from region 2 to region 1, if the two regions have the 
same technologies, the wage ratio increases. 
Proof: Rearrangement of equation (39) yields  
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Plugging equations (42) and (43) into (41) yields the following equation defining w  
implicitly: wt
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, 0/ 1 dLdw  if the 
two regions have the same production technologies.     Q.E.D. 
 
 Proposition 6 shows that movement of factors of production may act as a channel of 
concentration of industries.  The intuition behind Proposition 6 is as follows.  If firms in different 
regions have the same fixed and marginal costs, the percentage of output expansion for a 
manufacturing firm in region 1 is higher than that for a firm in region 2 when the price of 
manufactured goods in region 1 decreases.12  The reason is that the lower price of manufactured 
goods in region 1 leads to a lower profit margin per unit in region 1.  A higher level of output leads 
to a lower average cost and a higher real wage rate. 
 
6. CHOICE OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 
                                                 
12 The following is a numerical example.  Suppose that the price of manufactured goods in region 1 is 2, a 
firm’s marginal cost is 1, and the fixed cost is 10.  A manufactured firm in region 1 needs to produce 10 units 
of output to make a profit of zero.  Suppose that 50% of the goods transported arrive.  Thus, the price of 
manufactured goods in region 2 is 3 and a firm in region 2 needs to produce 5 units of output to make a profit 
of zero.  Now suppose the price of manufactured goods in region 1 decreases to 1.5. A firm in region 1 needs 
to produce 20 units of output to make a profit of zero, an increase of 100%.  The price of manufactured goods 
in region 2 will be 2.25 and a firm in region 2 needs to produce 8 units of output to make a profit of zero, an 
increase of 60%, which is lower than 100%.  
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In reality, firms located in different regions with different market sizes may use different 
production technologies.  According to Young (1928), the reason that the real wage rate in England 
is lower than that in the US is not because the entrepreneurs in the US are smarter or more 
industrious than their UK counterparts, but because the larger size of the US market leads 
entrepreneurs in the US to adopt technologies more suitable for larger scale of production.13  These 
larger scale production technologies lead to a lower average cost and a higher wage rate in the US.  
This section briefly discusses firms’ optimal choices of their production technologies.14 
It is assumed that there exists a continuum of technologies, indexed by n .  A higher level 
of n  means a more advanced technology.  For )(nf  denoting the fixed cost and )(n  denoting 
the marginal cost in terms of the amount of labor needed associated with technology level n , it is 
assumed that 0)(' nf  and 0)(' n .  That is, the fixed cost of production increases with n , 
and the marginal cost of production decreases with n .  A region i  firm’s level of technology is 
denoted by in .  A firm’s profit is i
m
i xp iiii wxnnf ))()((  , for 2,1i .  A firm chooses its 
production technology optimally.  The first order condition for a firm’s optimal choice of 
technology is 0)(')('  iii xnnf  .  The second order condition requires that 
0))('')(''(  iii xnnf  .  From the first and the second order conditions for a firm’s profit 
maximization, a firm’s optimal level of technology increases with its scale of production as a more 
advanced technology leads to a lower average cost for a larger scale of production.  
Suppose a region has a higher number of workers than the other one.  Firms in this region 
will adopt more advanced technologies as their scales of production are larger.  This leads to a 
                                                 
13 According to Young (1928, p. 530), “Mr. Ford’s methods would be absurdly uneconomical if his output 
were very small, and would be unprofitable even if his output were what many other manufacturers of 
automobiles would call large.” 
14 Ederington and McCalman (2004) have studied a model of technology choice in which firms engage in 
monopolistic competition.  A common feature between their model and this one is that a firm’s optimal 
technology is affected by its level of output.  Zhou (2007) studies the implications of choice of technology 
in an open economy model.  It is shown that the choice of technology acts as a link between external and 
internal increasing returns to scale. 
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lower average cost and thus a higher real wage rate as a firm makes a profit of zero.  A higher real 
wage rate in this region provides incentives for the immigration of workers from the other region.  
This leads to an even higher number of workers and an even more advanced technology.  The above 
process forms a circular causation and the choice of technology acts as a channel of concentration 
of industries. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper studies a general equilibrium model of economic geography based on 
oligopolistic competition.  It is shown that some results derived under monopolistic competition 
are robust under oligopolistic competition.  First, the real wage rate in terms of manufactured goods 
is higher and the real wage rate in terms of agricultural goods is lower in the region with a larger 
number of workers.  Second, a higher propensity to spend on manufactured goods and a lower 
elasticity of demand for manufactured goods make agglomeration more likely. 
This framework of oligopolistic competition is conducive to analytical results.  
Oligopolistic competition leads to a manufacturing firm’s output adjusts to the size of the market.  
This type of output adjustment has important implications.  First, as firms in different regions have 
different levels of output, even with increasing returns, regions engage in inter-industry trade.  
Second, adjustment of output leads to the result that factor movement affects the wage ratio 
monotonically.  Third and finally, manufacturing firms with different levels of output may choose 
different technologies. Choice of appropriate technology may act as a channel of concentration of 
industries. 
There are some interesting generalizations of the model.  First, as firms in different regions 
are not required to have the same production technology, this framework may be used to study 
regions with different levels of technological spillovers.  Technological spillovers can be very 
important in affecting the concentration of some research-intensive firms in a region.  Second, if 
the elasticity of demand for agricultural products decreases with income, concentration of industries 
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is more likely than the case in which a fixed percentage of income is spent on agricultural goods.  
The reason is that the benefit of living in a region with a lower price of manufactured goods is 
larger if the spending on manufactured goods increases with income.  Third and finally, to address 
the endogenous development of technologies, extending the model to a dynamic setup may be an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
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